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Although Justice Hanson’s1 judicial career spanned only seven 
years, his impact on the law in Minnesota will extend far into the 
future.  He often provided balance to the court in difficult or 
controversial cases, either writing for a narrow majority or a large 
minority.  In other instances, Justice Hanson stood out from the 
court with his unyielding desire to preserve the role of the judiciary 
in governing the common law and his call for sweeping reform in 
favor of recovery for victims of torts committed by the government.  
Whether the case called for defining the rights of the criminally 
       †   Jeff Ehrich is a 2005 magna cum laude graduate of William Mitchell 
College of Law.  Mr. Ehrich clerked for the Honorable Sam Hanson in 2005–2006, 
and he is currently practicing law at Leonard, Street and Deinard, P.A. in 
Minneapolis. 
 1. Associate Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court, 2002–2007.  Prior to joining 
the court, Justice Hanson was a trial lawyer for thirty-four years and a judge on the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals for two years.  Justice Hanson recently announced his 
retirement from the court to return to private practice at Briggs and Morgan in 
Minneapolis. 
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accused, interpreting intricate statutory provisions, applying the 
common law, or setting the scope and limits of the division of 
governmental powers, Justice Hanson’s passion for his work, 
attention to detail, careful deliberation, and impartial judgment 
are apparent in each of his opinions. 
I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Constitutional Rights 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has a celebrated history of 
interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the United 
States Constitution where “language, concerns, and traditions 
unique to Minnesota” justify extending additional rights to 
Minnesota citizens.2  Justice Hanson played an integral role in this 
function on several important occasions.  His majority opinion in 
Deegan v. State3 is one such example. 
Minnesota has a unique right of first appellate review by 
postconviction proceeding where a convicted defendant claims that 
“the conviction was obtained or that the sentence or other 
disposition made violated [his] rights under the constitution or 
laws of the United States or of the state.”4  A 2003 statute attempted 
to ease the financial burden on the public defenders’ office by 
allowing it to refuse a request for postconviction counsel under 
certain circumstances.5  The issue in Deegan was whether this 
 2. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005). 
 3. 711 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2006). 
 4. MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 1 (2006).  Section 590.01 was enacted in 
1967 in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari 
in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), which suggested that “a convicted 
defendant is entitled to at least one state corrective process to determine a claim 
of violation of Federal constitutional rights.”  State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 251, 
243 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1976).  Because section 590.01 permits review of state law 
violations in addition to state and federal constitutional violations, it provides 
broader grounds for relief than is arguably required by Case.  Id. 
 5. MINN. STAT. § 590.05 (2004).  The statute provided in relevant part: 
If, however, the person pled guilty and received a presumptive sentence 
or a downward departure in sentence, and the state public defender 
reviewed the person's case and determined that there was no basis for an 
appeal of the conviction or of the sentence, then the state public 
defender may decline to represent the person in a postconviction remedy 
case. 
Id.  This 2003 amended language was declared unconstitutional and was severed 
from the language of section 590.05 by Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 98. 
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limitation on the right to postconviction counsel violated the 
Minnesota Constitution.6
Writing for the five justice majority,7 Justice Hanson compared 
the Minnesota Postconviction Remedy Act and four decades of 
Minnesota interpretative law with the nature of postconviction 
remedies in other jurisdictions.8  After recognizing the unique 
nature of Minnesota’s “broad right of review in a first review by 
postconviction proceeding,”9 the court explained that “under the 
Minnesota Constitution . . . a defendant’s access to the other 
protections afforded in criminal proceedings cannot be 
meaningful without the assistance of counsel.”10  Justice Hanson 
wrote: 
Although we recognize the salutary purpose of the 2003 
amendment—to direct the limited public defender 
resources to the cases that will likely present the greatest 
need—we nevertheless conclude that the 2003 
amendment deprives some defendants of meaningful 
access to one review of a criminal conviction, in violation 
of their right to the assistance of counsel under Article I, 
section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution.  We hold that a 
defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel under 
Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution extends 
to one review of a criminal conviction, whether by direct 
appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding.  We 
therefore hold that section 590.05, as amended by Act of 
May 28, 2003, ch. 2, art. 3, § 2, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
Sess. 1400, 1401, is unconstitutional.11
Extending greater protections to citizens through 
constitutional interpretation often involves a careful balance 
between fundamental individual freedoms and significant 
governmental interests.  In Deegan, the court elevated the right to 
postconviction counsel over fiscal concerns of the government.12  
More difficult issues arise when the competing governmental 
 6. Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 97. 
 7. Justice Gildea took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.  
Justice G. Barry Anderson filed a dissenting opinion. 
 8. Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 93–94.  The United States Supreme Court has yet 
to definitively answer the question of whether the right to counsel extends to a 
first review by postconviction proceeding.  Id. 
 9. Id. at 94. 
 10. Id. at 98. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
3
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interest is crime control.  Justice Hanson’s majority opinion in State 
v. Carter13 is a unique example of the court’s attempt to maintain 
this delicate balance. 
The issue in Carter was whether a police-dog drug sniff—which 
courts have generally held to not be a “search”14—became a search 
when conducted in the less private setting of a self-storage rental 
unit.15  Normally, when a particular activity is classified as a search, 
police are required to have probable cause and a search warrant 
(or satisfy an exception to the search warrant requirement) prior to 
conducting that activity.16  Conversely, when an activity is not 
classified as a search, police are generally allowed to conduct the 
activity without any level of suspicion.17
But the Carter decision broke this mold.  Writing for the court, 
Justice Hanson recognized the heightened privacy interests 
implicated by self-storage units; but at the same time he 
acknowledged “the government has a significant interest in the use 
of drug-detection dogs in aid of law enforcement.”18  The solution 
 13. 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005). 
 14. This is true under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.  
The United States Supreme Court has, on at least two occasions, held that a dog 
sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search.  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 
(2005) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle is not a Fourth Amendment search); 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff of 
luggage in an airport was not a Fourth Amendment search).  Similarly, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff around a lawfully stopped 
vehicle was not a search under either the United States or Minnesota 
Constitutions.  State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2002).  But the 
Wiegand court concluded that even though not a search, a dog sniff of a vehicle at 
a police traffic stop required reasonable articulable suspicion because it extended 
the duration of the seizure.  Id. at 135. 
 15. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 209–10.  Although the United States Supreme Court 
has not addressed the precise issue of whether a dog sniff of a self-storage unit is a 
search, it has held that a dog sniff of a vehicle lawfully seized on a public roadway 
is not a search.  Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.  Moreover, the Carter court noted that “all 
of the state and lower federal court decisions that have addressed that issue have 
concluded that a dog sniff outside a storage unit is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208 (citations omitted).  Thus, the Carter 
court concluded that “a drug-detection dog sniff in the area immediately outside a 
self-storage unit is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 209. 
 16. Id. at 211. 
 17. See Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 133.  There are exceptions to this general rule, 
such as when the activity extends the duration of an otherwise lawful seizure 
without a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity justifying the extension.  Id. at 
136. 
 18. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211–12.  An earlier Justice Hanson majority decision 
acknowledged similar heightened privacy interests in self-storage units despite 
their “commercial” nature and the often broad right of the landlord to enter and 
4
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was for the three-justice plurality to create a “middle ground” 
standard that “balances a person’s expectation of privacy against 
the government’s interest in using dogs to detect illegal drugs.”19  
This hybrid approach classifies a dog sniff of a self-storage unit as a 
search,20 but only requires that the officer articulate a “reasonable 
suspicion” of drug activity.21  The court adopted this standard, 
which is lower than probable cause, from Fourth Amendment 
seizure law.22
Carter is a significant decision because of the implications for 
other less intrusive law enforcement activities—such as facial 
recognition software, thermal imaging devices, breath alcohol 
content detection devices, and other technologies yet to be 
developed—used in other quasi-public locations, such as parked 
vehicles, school lockers, student book bags, and travel luggage.  
Because of the harsh consequences on either side of the traditional 
inspect the units.  See State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 249–50 (Minn. 2003) 
(holding permission from landlord was ineffective to satisfy the consent exception 
to the search warrant requirement). 
 19. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211.  This middle ground approach caused sharp 
division among the court.  Justice Russell Anderson dissented, arguing that a dog 
sniff is not a search.  Id. at 212–15 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting).  Justice Page 
and Chief Justice Blatz focused on the heightened privacy interest in storage units 
and would have required probable cause and thus a search warrant prior to 
conducting a dog sniff.  Id. at 212 (Page, J., concurring specially).  Justice G. Barry 
Anderson was not a member of the court at the time of submission and thus took 
no part in the decision. 
 20. Justice Hanson was careful to “specifically limit” the scope of the decision 
to drug-detecting dogs, noting that the court was expressing “no opinion 
regarding bomb-detection dogs, as to which the special needs of law enforcement 
might well be significantly greater.”  Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211 n.8.  Justice Hanson 
later wrote a lengthy concurring opinion in a case involving the admission of dog-
sniff evidence at a civil trial.  Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 
510, 531 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J., concurring).  He identified “two serious layers 
of subjectivity involved in dog sniff evidence,” and concluded that while “a dog’s 
alert may provide probable cause to support a dog’s search,” such evidence should 
be inadmissible at a civil forfeiture trial, in part, because of its imprecise, 
unscientific nature.  Id. at 533–36. 
 21. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212. 
 22. When a police officer can articulate specific observations that led the 
officer to reasonably believe that a person has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a criminal offense, the officer may temporarily seize that person 
in order to confirm or refute his or her suspicion.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).  In contrast, an 
officer must have probable cause in order to make a full custodial arrest.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV (providing that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause”). 
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search versus no search dichotomy, the Carter court’s hybrid 
standard is likely to gain popularity. 
Justice Hanson led the court in another unique instance of 
balancing interests protected by the Minnesota Constitution with 
strong competing governmental interests in State v. Schmidt.23  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court previously held that under the 
Minnesota Constitution, a motorist has a right to counsel before 
deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.24  The court also 
permitted, in certain circumstances, collateral attacks on the 
constitutionality of prior convictions to prevent the use of those 
convictions for enhancement purposes.25  The issue in Schmidt was 
whether the defendant could collaterally attack two South Dakota 
DWI convictions, where (as in most states) there was no 
constitutional right to counsel before submitting to chemical 
testing.26
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson first concluded that 
principles of conflict of laws and full faith and credit generally 
require respect for and thus recognition of South Dakota’s final 
judgments.27  But the court also recognized the competing interest 
of enforcing the protections of the Minnesota Constitution, and 
thus adopted a “very narrow” public policy exception to the general 
rule of not allowing a collateral challenge to out-of-state 
convictions.28  The court concluded that, although a constitutional 
right, the right to pre-chemical test counsel is “more limited in 
nature” than other constitutional rights, due in part to its many 
 23. 712 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 2006). 
 24. Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991). 
 25. See, e.g., State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1983).  The 
defendant in Nordstrom argued that his offense could not be enhanced by his prior 
DWI conviction because the prior conviction contained no record that he made a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.  Id. at 903.  The 
supreme court held that “[a]bsent that valid waiver on the record of defendant’s 
right to counsel, the misdemeanor DWI conviction based on an uncounseled plea 
of guilty cannot be used as the basis of a gross misdemeanor charge.”  Id. at 905. 
 26. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534. 
 27. Id. at 536–37.  The court explained that this was because “the right to 
counsel for a test decision under the Minnesota Constitution is only triggered by a 
prosecution in Minnesota,” and thus South Dakota has a greater interest in 
governing the “police conduct of the traffic stop, arrest, and ultimate test 
decision.”  Id. at 536. 
 28. Id. at 537.  The court borrowed this exception from the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971) (“A judgment rendered in one State 
of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a sister State if such 
recognition . . . would involve an improper interference with important interests 
of the sister State.”). 
6
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exceptions.29  Thus, the court held that foreign convictions may be 
used to enhance a Minnesota offense even if based on an 
uncounseled chemical test decision that would violate Friedman if 
taken in Minnesota.30
These decisions demonstrate Justice Hanson’s active but 
cautious approach to interpreting the Minnesota Constitution.  His 
work reflects his objectivity and careful deliberation over issues that 
implicate one of the more controversial and important debates in 
our democratic society: balancing individual freedoms with crime 
control.  Moreover, his exercise of judicial restraint in confining 
holdings to their facts—often manifested in his frequent statements 
about what the court is not holding—does not detract from the 
practicality of his opinions.  His well-reasoned, understandable, and 
logical decisions leave practitioners with little doubt as to the scope 
of the rule of law established therein, as well as provide useful 
frameworks for future application.31
 29. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 538–39.  While noting hesitation to “distinguish 
between the importance of constitutional rights,” Justice Hanson characterized 
this as a “unique case” that justified such prioritization.  Id. at 538 n.4. 
 30. Id. at 539.  The court was careful to note that it was expressing no opinion 
on the use of foreign convictions obtained under circumstances that would have 
violated the right to counsel in Minnesota in other contexts.  Id. at 537–38.  Thus, 
in State v. Borst, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from most other 
jurisdictions in recognizing the right to counsel for indigents facing misdemeanor 
charges, even if there is no possibility of imprisonment.  278 Minn. 388, 154 
N.W.2d 888 (1967).  The Schmidt court also noted that it did not believe it 
necessary “to determine whether the public policy exception would apply to a 
foreign conviction that is based on an uncounseled plea and that would violate 
Borst if it had been taken in Minnesota.”  712 N.W.2d at 537–38. 
 31. See also, e.g., Wanzek Constr., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 679 
N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2004).  Wanzek involved the interpretation of clause in a 
standard form commercial general liability policy of insurance that provided 
coverage for damage to the insured’s work only if the damage arose out of the 
work of the insured’s “subcontractor.”  Noting that the term “subcontractor” had 
no policy definition and did not incorporate any statutory or regulatory definition 
of the term, Justice Hanson (writing for the majority) explained that the term was 
ambiguous, and thus had to be construed broadly and in favor of coverage.  
Although the court chose to find that the materials supplier at issue was a 
“subcontractor” based on the unique facts presented in the case, Justice Hanson’s 
concise and articulate explanation of the court’s holding resulted in a useful, two 
part test for interpreting this standard insurance policy clause: “We hold that 
where, as here, a supplier custom fabricates the materials to the owner’s 
specifications and provides on-site services in connection with the installation, the 
supplier meets the definition of subcontractor under the exception to the ‘your 
works’ exclusion.”  Id. at 329.  Demonstrating the practicality of this holding, this 
author recently litigated an insurance coverage case that was centered entirely 
around Justice Hanson’s formulation of the subcontractor test from Wanzek.  See 
7
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B. Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
While Justice Hanson was one of the more moderate members 
of the court when addressing issues of constitutional interpretation, 
he took a more aggressive approach when faced with issues 
pertaining to waiver of constitutional rights.  Whether writing for a 
unanimous court or in a solo dissent, Justice Hanson has 
unequivocally taken the position that constitutional rights cannot 
be denied by anything short of a knowing, voluntarily, and 
intelligent waiver. 
In State v. Caulfield,32 the court unanimously agreed that the 
admission of a drug test lab report, in lieu of live testimony by the 
lab technician who performed the analysis, violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.33  But the state argued 
that the defendant waived his right to confrontation by failing to 
comply with a Minnesota “notice-and-demand statute,” which 
required the defendant to give the state notice at least ten days 
prior to trial if he or she wanted live testimony from an analyst.34  
This issue divided the court.  Justice Hanson drew the majority in 
concluding that: 
[A]lthough there may be legitimate public policy reasons 
to advance the time to assert confrontation rights to a 
reasonable time before trial, such a shift cannot be 
constitutionally accomplished without adequate notice to 
the defendant that his failure to request the testimony of 
the analysis will result in the waiver of his confrontation 
rights, especially when the report is offered to prove an 
element of the offense with which the defendant is 
charged.35
The court explained that without notice of the report’s 
contents and the consequence for failing to request testimony, 
“there is no reasonable basis to conclude that a defendant’s failure 
Web Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 06-5061, 2007 WL 4230751 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 29, 2007). 
 32. 722 N.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Minn. 2006). 
 33. Id. at 306–07. 
 34. MINN. STAT. § 634.15, subdiv. 2 (2004).  The statute at issue permitted the 
admission of “a report of the facts and results of any laboratory analysis or 
examination if it is prepared and attested by the person performing the analysis or 
examination in any laboratory operated by the Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension.”  Id. at subdiv. 1(a)(1). 
 35. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313. 
8
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to request the testimony constituted a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his confrontation rights.”36
State v. Licari37 involved the ability of a police officer to search a 
rented storage locker based on the consent of a landlord who had 
the contractual right to enter the storage unit for “inspection” 
purposes.38  Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson first 
distinguished between consent by a co-inhabitant, which can be 
effective, and consent by a landlord, which is generally ineffective.39  
The court then rejected the state’s argument that the officer was 
justified in relying on the landlord’s apparent authority to conduct 
the search.40  Justice Hanson wrote: 
While searches based on honest, reasonable mistakes of 
fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment, a 
police officer’s mistake of search and seizure law (here, a 
mistake as to the legal requirements for the authority of a 
landlord to consent to a search) cannot be reasonable.  
“Otherwise, the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
would be effectively limited to what the average police 
officer believed was reasonable.”41
It is reassuring, to say the least, that a citizen does not waive a 
constitutional right simply because a police officer made an 
incorrect on-the-spot interpretation of search and seizure law. 
Another waiver case produced the rare occasion for 
companion dissents by Justice Hanson and now Chief Justice 
Russell Anderson.  The majority in Spann v. State42 held that, after 
conviction and sentencing, a defendant cannot waive the right to 
appeal.43  In dissent, Justice Anderson noted the importance of plea 
bargaining in our criminal justice system and argued that 
 36. Id.  Justice G. Barry Anderson filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that 
although the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension lab report was testimonial, the 
defendant waived his right to confrontation by failing to request live testimony.  Id. 
at 317–19 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).  Justices Russell Anderson and 
Gildea joined in his dissent. 
 37. 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2003). 
 38. Id. at 251–52. 
 39. Id. at 252. 
 40. Id. at 254. 
 41. Id. (quoting Peterson v. People, 939 P.2d 824, 831 (Colo. 1997)). 
 42. 704 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 2005). 
 43. Id. at 493.  Citing numerous public policy and due process considerations, 
the majority explained that even a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of 
the right to appeal offends the integrity of the judicial system, allows the state to 
take advantage of the disparity in bargaining power, and allows the state “to hide 
its own misconduct and errors.”  Id. at 493–94. 
9
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“institutional concerns related to the integrity of a conviction 
obtained by plea agreement or by trial are equally important” to 
the integrity of a conviction obtained by jury trial.44  Because plea 
bargaining is fundamental to our criminal justice system, Justice 
Anderson would have remanded for a “comprehensive inquiry by 
the district court” as to whether Mr. Spann’s waiver was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.45  Justice Hanson agreed that the right to 
appeal can be waived, but would have gone further and concluded 
that the facts of the case supported a finding of a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver as a matter of law.46  Alternatively, 
Justice Hanson would have concluded that even if the waiver were 
invalid, the appropriate remedy was to challenge the effectiveness 
of his counsel in securing a proper waiver in a postconviction 
proceeding.47
C. Evidentiary Rules 
Rights contained in the rules of evidence are often as 
important to the fairness of a trial as constitutional rights 
themselves.  For example, courts have long recognized that direct 
evidence of a third party’s commission of a crime (direct third-
party perpetrator evidence) is admissible under Rule 402.48  The 
 44. Id. at 495–96 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting).  Justice Anderson also 
pointed out the ironic result of the majority’s decision: a criminal defendant can 
waive almost any constitutional right, but not the statutory right to appeal.  Id. at 495. 
 45. Id. at 497. 
 46. Id. at 497–98 (Hanson, J., dissenting).  The defendant was represented by 
counsel, was fully aware of the precise issues on appeal, signed a letter drafted by 
his attorney waiving his rights, and stated on the record that he was aware of his 
rights and was voluntarily waiving them.  Id. at 497–98. 
 47. Id. at 498–99.  When accepting a plea bargain, the rules of criminal 
procedure require the court to make detailed inquiry as to the validity of the 
waiver of trial rights.  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 (2008).  Justice Russell Anderson 
would have imposed similar requirements on the district court for waivers of 
appeal rights.  Spann, 704 N.W.2d at 497 (Anderson, Russell, J., dissenting).  
Justice Hanson did not believe the district court’s failure to inquire was fatal to the 
waiver.  Id. at 498 (Hanson, J., dissenting).  Instead, he would have shifted the 
burden to the defendant to “challenge his appeal waiver [in a postconviction 
proceeding] by alleging facts showing that his waiver was the product of ineffective 
assistance of counsel or was otherwise not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.”  Id. 
 48. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Minn. 1977).  MINNESOTA RULES 
OF EVIDENCE 402 (2004) provides, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, the State Constitution, 
statute, by these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.  
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”  Evidence that a third party 
10
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more difficult issue is when a defendant can submit evidence of a 
third party’s prior bad acts to suggest that the third party also 
committed the charged offense.49  This “reverse-Spreigl evidence” 
presents a tension between honoring the defendant’s right to 
present potentially exonerating evidence and avoiding collateral 
trials on irrelevant character evidence of third parties.50  
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has required a 
heightened standard for the admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence.51
Applying this reverse-Spreigl standard and separating reverse-
Spreigl from direct third-party perpetrator evidence has divided the 
court on several occasions during Justice Hanson’s tenure.  Facing 
charges related to the death of a child under his care, the 
defendant in State v. Gutierrez attempted to introduce evidence of a 
third party’s (1) history of abusing children and (2) presence at the 
home where the child died around the time of death.52  While 
acknowledging that the district court improperly blended the 
standards for reverse-Spreigl and third-party perpetrator evidence,53 
the majority nonetheless affirmed the district court’s exclusion of 
the evidence because its potential for unfair prejudice outweighed 
committed the crime is obviously relevant to the issue of whether the charged 
defendant committed the crime. 
 49. E.g., State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 458, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (1949) (A 
criminal defendant “should . . . have the right to show that crimes of a similar 
nature have been committed by some other person when the acts of such other 
person are so closely connected in point of time and method of operation as to 
cast doubt upon the identification of defendant as the person who committed the 
crime charged against him.”). 
 50. Spreigl evidence is evidence of other crimes or bad acts offered by the state 
as evidence that the defendant committed the crime in question.  State v. Johnson, 
568 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn. 1997); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 495, 139 
N.W.2d 167, 172 (1965).  Reverse-Spreigl evidence is character evidence offered by 
the defendant as evidence that a third party committed the charged crime.  State 
v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn. 1999).  See also State v. Deans, 356 N.W.2d 
674, 676 (Minn. 1984). 
 51. The foundational requirements for admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence 
are: “(1) clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the 
Spreigl incident; (2) that the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state's 
case; and (3) that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential 
for unfair prejudice.”  Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 433. 
 52. State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 436–37 (Minn. 2003). 
 53. The district court applied a clear and convincing standard—the first 
prong of the reverse-Spreigl test—to the second prong of the test: relevance and 
materiality.  Id. at 437.  The district court concluded that the defendant failed to 
satisfy the second prong because he did not establish the relevance of the history 
of child abuse—which was the third party’s presence at the home at the time of 
death—by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. 
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its probative value.54  Justice Hanson filed a concurring opinion in 
which he agreed that the third party’s history of child abuse was 
properly excluded reverse-Spreigl evidence, but clarified that the 
evidence of the third party’s presence at the home was admissible 
as direct third-party perpetrator evidence.55  He identified that the 
confusion in this case arose because third-party perpetrator 
evidence “serves both as exculpatory evidence for the defendant 
and as foundation evidence for the use of reverse-Spreigl 
evidence.”56
In State v. Richardson,57 Justices Hanson and Meyer again 
departed from the majority on a reverse-Spreigl issue.58  The 
defendant wanted to testify that a third party fired the fatal shot 
and that this third party had motive and intent to do so as 
demonstrated by her abusive relationship with the deceased.59  The 
majority affirmed the exclusion of this evidence because it did not 
satisfy the reverse-Spreigl standard and, alternatively, because any 
error in its admission was harmless.60  Justice Hanson disagreed, 
explaining that the defendant’s eyewitness testimony was clearly 
admissible because it was more properly classified as direct third-
party perpetrator evidence (not reverse-Spreigl evidence).61  As for 
the true reverse-Spreigl evidence, Justice Hanson would have 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it was 
adequately connected to the charged offense.62
 54. Id. at 437–38.  More specifically, the court held that the evidence “has 
limited probative value and serves no purpose other than to attempt to persuade 
the jury that [the third party] was in some way responsible for [the child’s] death 
merely because she was not an ideal mother.”  Id. 
 55. Id. at 440 (Hanson, J., concurring).  As for the past history of child abuse, 
Justice Hanson actually would have gone further and held that all three prongs of 
the reverse-Spreigl test had not been satisfied.  Id.  Justice Meyer joined in Justice 
Hanson’s concurrence. 
 56. Id. at 439.  Justice Hanson ultimately concluded that the district court’s 
reverse-Spreigl analysis was harmless error because it technically did not prevent 
the defendant from offering evidence of the third party’s presence at the home.  
Id. at 440. 
 57. 670 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2003). 
 58. Id. at 289 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  This time, 
Justice Hanson would have remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
admissibility of the evidence.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 274–75 (majority opinion). 
 60. Id. at 277–80. 
 61. Id. at 289–90 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  The 
majority did not specifically address the admissibility of the defendant’s own 
eyewitness testimony. 
 62. Id. at 290.  Justice Hanson would have concluded that the reverse-Spreigl 
12
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D. Substantive Criminal Law 
Justice Hanson also made important contributions in the area 
of substantive criminal law.  In State v. Edwards,63 he achieved the 
rare feat of effecting a change in a pattern criminal jury instruction 
through a dissenting opinion.64  On appeal from a first-degree 
murder conviction, Edwards argued that the district court erred in 
giving a pattern jury instruction that inaccurately stated the 
common law rule regarding conduct that forfeits a defendant’s 
right to act in self-defense.65  The instruction allowed the jury to 
conclude that Edwards had no right to defend himself if he “began 
or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in 
the defendant’s own defense.”66  Although Edwards’ conviction was 
affirmed by a majority of the court, Justice Hanson drew a separate 
majority67 in his conclusion that the jury instruction was legally 
inaccurate because (1) it did not contain a causal nexus between 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the victim’s use of deadly 
force, and (2) “it d[id] not require a finding that the defendant 
was in some way culpable in beginning the ‘incident.’”68  After 
evidence was admissible because the state opened the door to character evidence 
by eliciting positive character evidence of the relationship between the deceased 
and the third party.  Id. at 291. 
 63. 717 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2006). 
 64. Id. at 414 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 410 (plurality opinion). 
 66. Id.  The instruction in its entirety provided: 
If the defendant began or induced the incident that led to the necessity 
of using force in the defendant’s own defense, the right to stand the 
defendant’s ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available 
to him.  Instead, the defendant must first have declined to carry on the 
affray and have honestly tried to escape from it, and must clearly and 
fairly have informed the adversary of a desire for peace and of 
abandonment of the contest.  Only after the defendant has done that will 
the law justify the defendant in thereafter standing his ground and using 
force against the other person. 
Id. (quoting 10 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE—JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, CRIMINAL, CRIMJIG 7.07 (4th ed. 1999)). 
 67. Three justices believed the jury instruction accurately stated the law and 
was not in need of revision.  717 N.W.2d at 412.  Two justices joined in Justice 
Hanson’s dissent.  The swing vote came from Justice Paul Anderson, who agreed 
with Justice Hanson that “CRIMJIG 7.07 . . . [might have] misstate[d] the law and 
[was] in need of revision,” but agreed with “the majority’s alternative conclusion 
that any error in the submission of the instruction was harmless.”  Id. at 414 
(Anderson, Paul, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 416 (Hanson, J., dissenting).  In other words, Justice Hanson 
explained that the conduct forfeiting the right to act in self-defense must have 
been wrongful and must have provoked or otherwise caused the victim’s violent 
13
Ehrich: A Legacy of Scholarship: The Judicial Decisions of Justice Samuel
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
2. EHRICH - ADC 5/3/2008  11:05:08 AM 
1262 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
 
analyzing self-defense forfeiture instructions in other states and 
instructions proposed in legal commentary, Justice Hanson offered 
a much simpler and more logical instruction: 
I would conclude that the right of self-defense is forfeited 
where the victim’s use of deadly force was legally justified, 
that is, where the victim’s application of deadly force was 
“necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the 
[victim] reasonably believe[d] expose[d] the [victim] . . . 
to great bodily harm or death.”69
Justice Hanson’s dissent in Edwards resulted in a change to the 
pattern jury instruction.70  Edwards was also unique because the 
legislature specifically left the development of this area of 
substantive criminal law to the judiciary.71  But where the legislature 
has addressed an area of substantive criminal law, Justice Hanson’s 
opinions demonstrate deference and restraint. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Separation of powers is a particularly sensitive subject in this 
age when judges are routinely accused of legislating from the 
response.  The instruction did not make clear that innocent behaviors, such as 
beginning a conversation or glaring at the victim, are insufficient to justify self-
defense forfeiture.  In short, the instruction inadequately described what conduct 
justified forfeiture, thus presenting the danger that the jury would find innocent 
conduct justified forfeiture. 
 69. Id. at 420 (alteration in original).  This instruction contains the requisite 
culpability because if the victim had the right to act in self-defense, the defendant 
was necessarily acting wrongfully.  The causal nexus is also satisfied by this 
formulation because the victim could have only been legally justified to act in self-
defense if the defendant performed some unlawful act that caused the victim to 
reasonably fear great bodily harm or death. 
 70. The Committee on Criminal Jury Instruction Guides declined to adopt 
Justice Hanson’s formulation of the instruction.  Instead, it substituted the word 
“incident” with the word “assault,” concluding that this change “incorporates the 
policy choices discussed in Justice Hanson’s dissent and recognizes the reasonable 
beliefs of the victim in responding to defendant’s initial assault.”  10 MINN. DIST. 
JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CRIMINAL § 
7.07 cmt. (5th ed. 2007).  While this formulation may contain the requisite causal 
nexus, it fails to require that the victim’s violent response (i.e. the conduct 
necessitating the use of deadly force) be commensurate with the actor’s conduct 
that began the assault.  By permitting a finding of self-defense forfeiture even 
though the victim responded with a disproportionate level of force, the 
amendment to section 7.07 probably does not adequately address Justice Hanson’s 
culpability concern.  For example, a person could start a fistfight but not be legally 
justified in defending himself if the other party began unlawfully using a firearm. 
 71. See MINN. STAT. § 609.06 cmt. (2006).  “Such questions are left for judicial 
development . . . .”  Id. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/6
2. EHRICH - ADC 5/3/2008  11:05:08 AM 
2008] A LEGACY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1263 
 
bench simply because the accuser happens to disagree with the 
result.  While judicial activism (when truly present) is regrettable, 
abdicating judicial responsibilities out of fear of public perception 
can be equally repugnant.  Justice Hanson cannot be accused of 
either.  His decisions reveal his care in recognizing and giving 
effect to the sometimes ultra-fine distinctions among the respective 
roles of the three branches of government.  Additionally, they 
demonstrate his deference where the legislature has acted, his 
rigorous defense for the judiciary’s role in governing the common 
law where the legislature has not acted, and his judicial restraint 
when defining the implied or “inherent” powers of the court. 
A. Legislative Functions 
The majority of the court in State v. Smith72 reversed a 
conviction for first-degree murder while committing kidnapping 
because fairness required “that confinement or removal must be 
criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely 
incidental to the underlying crime, in order to justify a separate 
criminal sentence.”73  Noting the legislature’s “exclusive authority 
to define crimes and offenses,” Justice Hanson dissented, stating 
the crime of kidnapping “include[s] confinement or removal that 
is minimal and that may even be completely incidental to another 
facilitated offense.”74  Justice Hanson recognized that this could 
produce harsh results, but instead of reversing a conviction based 
on the similarity of the two offenses, Justice Hanson would have 
held that the incidental nature of the crime should only be a factor 
in the district court’s sentencing determination.75  As to the 
 72. 669 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 2003). 
 73. Id. at 32.  In State v. Earl, the court had occasion to apply this criminally 
significant/merely incidental standard.  Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson 
concluded that the confinement and removal of a family in a home “may have 
been necessary to commit the burglary,” but was not merely incidental because of 
the defendant’s purposeful behavior of awaking the family, binding them with 
electrical tape, and standing by while his accomplice burglarized the house.  702 
N.W.2d 711, 722–23 (Minn. 2005). 
 74. Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 35–36 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 75. Id. at 38.  The crime of rape necessarily involves confinement of a person, 
and thus a kidnapping.  Under Justice Hanson’s approach, though the perpetrator 
could be convicted of both crimes, the district court should examine the specific 
facts of the case and decline to impose consecutive sentences if doing so would 
unduly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct or be otherwise unreasonable or 
excessive.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.11, subdiv. 2(b) (2002)).  Because the 
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argument that prosecutors could abuse their charging discretion if 
the definition of kidnapping is not limited, Justice Hanson 
explained that these concerns “cannot be addressed by changing 
the legislature’s definition of the crime but only by exercising the 
court’s supervisory powers to prevent sentences that ‘are 
unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive or unjustifiably disparate.’”76  
Thus, Justice Hanson’s approach would have achieved the same 
fairness concerns as the majority, but in a manner that perhaps 
more appropriately recognizes the role of the legislature in 
defining crimes and offenses. 
B. Executive Functions 
In an issue of first impression, the court in Schermer v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.77 was asked to apply the federal “filed-rate 
doctrine” to dismiss a suit challenging the legality of an insurance 
company’s rate structure filed with a state executive agency.78  
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson examined the history of 
and the policy considerations underlying the filed-rate doctrine.79  
The court concluded that the traditional rationales for the federal 
filed-rate doctrine—justiciability, separation of powers, and 
legislative intent—applied equally to the Minnesota insurance 
appellant did not raise this argument, Justice Hanson would have affirmed the 
conviction.  Id. 
  A short time later, an appellant did in fact argue that his sentence unduly 
exaggerated the criminality of his conduct partly because his kidnapping 
conviction was based on minimal confinement.  State v. Welch, 675 N.W.2d 615, 
621 (Minn. 2004).  Relying on Smith, the majority reversed the kidnapping 
conviction altogether.  Id.  As in Smith, Justice Hanson filed a dissenting opinion 
indicating that instead of reversing the kidnapping conviction, he would modify 
the 45 month sentence for kidnapping to run concurrently (instead of 
consecutively) with the 150 month sentence for attempted criminal sexual 
conduct.  Id. (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 76. Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 35 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 77. 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006). 
 78. Id. at 314.  Generally, the filed-rate doctrine prevents the judiciary from 
reviewing the reasonableness or legality of a rate filed with and approved by an 
agency within the executive branch.  See Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 
156, 163–64 (1922).  Rationales for the doctrine include: (1) the judiciary being 
ill-suited to second-guess the decisions of regulatory agencies; (2) the inability of 
the judiciary to calculate damages because of the highly specialized nature of 
setting rates for regulated industries; (3) deference to legislative intent to confine 
rate-making authority to the executive branch; and (4) considerations of 
separation of powers.  See Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311–13. 
 79. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311–13. 
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regulatory scheme.80  No doubt drawing from Justice Hanson’s 
thirty-four years of experience practicing in the area of regulated 
utilities,81 the court provided unique insight into another rationale 
for the doctrine that has apparently not been articulated by any 
other court: 
[W]hen a regulatory agency approves rates, it seeks to 
achieve a balance by assuring that the rates are not 
excessive for ratepayers but yet are adequate to satisfy the 
regulated entity’s due process right to earn a reasonable 
return.  And, for insurance rates specifically, “[r]ate 
regulation is designed to generate premium charges that 
are equitable for each policyholder-insured as well as yield 
insurers a fair return for the risks undertaken.”  When a 
court is asked to determine whether one part of the rate 
structure is unlawful, as applied to a subset of ratepayers, 
it must necessarily interfere with the function delegated 
by the legislature to the DOC, and it has neither the 
expertise nor the mechanisms to deal with the entire rate 
structure or the adequacy of the return to the regulated 
entity.82
Thus, the court refrained from infringing on the executive 
branch’s quasi-legislative function of designing and governing rates 
for regulated industries. 
Kmart Corp. v. County of Stearns83 involved the scope of the 
legislature’s delegation of quasi-judicial powers to the executive 
branch.  The core issue in Kmart was whether the supreme court’s 
interpretation of a statute should only be applied prospectively 
because the tax court had interpreted the same statute differently 
in prior cases.84  The supreme court has previously recognized this 
purely prospective ruling doctrine in very limited circumstances 
when a court reverses clearly established precedent upon which 
litigants have relied.85  Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson 
 80. Id. at 315–17. 
 81. Id. at 314.  Indeed, the Schermer majority relied in part on Hibbing Taconite 
Co. v. Minnesota Public Service Commission, 302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1980), a rate case in 
which Justice Hanson participated as an attorney more than twenty-five years 
before. 
 82. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 314 (citations omitted). 
 83. 710 N.W.2d 761 (Minn. 2006). 
 84. Id. at 767. 
 85. Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 1982).  But even in 
situations where clearly established precedent has been overruled, the court will 
not apply the purely prospective ruling doctrine unless doing so is consistent with 
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distinguished between the role of the tax court, which is an 
administrative agency within the executive branch, and that of an 
appellate court within the judicial branch.86  The court explained 
that while stare decisis applies to the latter, decisions of the tax 
court “have little, if any, precedential effect.”87  Thus the court 
concluded that even if these prior tax court decisions “could be 
characterized as being ‘clearly established,’ . . . they do not qualify 
as the type of ‘precedent’ on which litigants may rely for 
retroactivity purposes.”88  Although the Kmart court did not 
explicitly identify separation of powers as a basis for its holding, the 
same principals underlie its refusal to essentially give precedential 
effect to an executive official’s interpretation of a statute while 
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. 
C.  Judicial Functions 
The district court in State v. Chauvin89 was faced with a unique 
situation that required the supreme court’s clarification on the 
demarcation between legislative and judicial functions in 
sentencing criminal offenders.  Although presented with evidence 
of aggravating circumstances that would justify departure from the 
presumptive guideline sentence, the mechanism for doing so had 
been held unconstitutional.90  The defendant argued that absent 
legislative authority to utilize a sentencing jury, the only option was 
the purpose and history of the rule in question and the relative equities involved.  
Id. 
 86. Kmart, 721 N.W.2d at 769. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 723 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 2006). 
 90. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines previously authorized a district 
court judge (not a jury) to make findings on aggravating circumstances and to 
impose an upward sentencing departure if it found the circumstances to exist by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2004).  In Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Washington Sentencing Guidelines, which were substantially similar to the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, violated an accused’s constitutional right to a 
jury trial and proof of each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Relying on Blakely, the Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently struck down 
Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines to the extent it “permit[ted] an upward 
durational departure based on judicial findings.”  State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 
131, 143 (Minn. 2005).  Although the legislature later amended the guidelines to 
authorize district courts to impanel sentencing juries to make findings on 
sentencing factors, there was a gap of several months where district courts were 
left with no guidance on how to impose sentencing departures. 
18
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for the court to impose the presumptive guideline sentence.91  Not 
persuaded, the district court impaneled a sentencing jury and 
imposed an aggravated sentence based on the jury’s finding of the 
existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.92  
Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson described the historical 
and constitutional role of the judiciary in determining court 
procedural matters and safeguarding “the rights of criminal 
defendants.”93  Characteristic of Justice Hanson’s opinions, the 
Chauvin court was careful to limit the scope of its holding to 
situations where exercising the court’s inherent power did “the 
least amount of damage” to a statutory scheme that had been 
deemed partially unconstitutional and where exercising the power 
“did not infringe on the legislative function of creating a 
sentencing guideline system.”94
 91. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d at 23.  “[He] objected to any proceeding that would 
result in a departure from the presumptive sentence of 24 months because there 
were no rules or statutes authorizing the procedure that the court was 
contemplating.”  Id. 
 92. See id. (describing the procedure used by the district court). 
 93. Id. at 25–26. 
 94. Id. at 24–27.  In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a three-part 
test articulated in In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Compensation, 308 Minn. 172, 
180–81, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976).  Although many supreme court opinions 
discussing the court’s inherent authority cite to the Lyon County test, most only 
discuss the historical and constitutional authority for the court’s inherent powers 
while ignoring the other two prongs of the test (necessity and whether it infringes 
on a function of another branch of government).  Justice Hanson’s strict 
application of each prong of the Lyon County test is important to avoid overbroad 
applications of the court’s inherent powers and to ensure proper allocation of 
governmental powers. 
  By way of contrast, State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996), is a 
controversial example of the supreme court not applying all three prongs of the 
Lyon County test.  As background to the Krotzer decision, it is well-established that 
absent evidence of selective or discriminatory intent, considerations of separation 
of powers provide criminal prosecutors with absolute discretion in making 
criminal charging determinations.  See State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n.3 
(Minn. 1980); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (stating 
that the decision whether or not to prosecute generally rests entirely with 
prosecutor).  In Krotzer, a 19-year-old man was charged with statutory rape for 
having otherwise consensual sex with a 14-year-old.  548 N.W.2d at 253.  The 
child’s mother was aware of the incident and reached an amicable resolution 
without police involvement that ultimately resulted in her consent to a non-sexual 
relationship between the two.  Id.  Still, the state pressed charges.  Despite the 
prosecutor’s objection, the district court imposed a stay of adjudication of these 
mitigating circumstances.  Id.  Relying on the distinction between the prosecutor’s 
charging function and the district court’s sentencing function, the supreme court 
affirmed.  Id. at 254.  But the court failed to take into account the unique nature 
of a stay of adjudication, which essentially nullifies a charge after a certain period 
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While sentencing involves a blend of judicial and legislative 
functions, matters of court procedure are clearly for the courts.  
State v. Lemmer involved a challenge to a legislative pronouncement 
that affected a traditional judicial function: re-litigating issues that 
have already been determined by a court.95  The statute at issue in 
Lemmer prevented courts from applying the collateral estoppel 
doctrine in a DWI proceeding, even though the issue had already 
been determined in an implied consent proceeding.96  Although 
acknowledging that collateral estoppel is a judicial function, the 
majority upheld the statute as a matter of comity because the 
elements of collateral estoppel are not satisfied by virtue of the fact 
that the two proceedings are prosecuted by different parts of the 
government.97  Justice Hanson dissented, arguing that the elements 
of collateral estoppel were satisfied by a defendant who prevailed in 
an implied consent proceeding.98  As to the constitutionality of the 
statute, he examined the similarities between the two proceedings 
and other public policy considerations, and concluded that: 
[b]ecause the public policy considerations that underlie 
the collateral estoppel doctrine are fundamental to the 
judicial function, and the detriment to the state of being 
of lawful behavior.  By not focusing on the impact of the charging function of 
executive branch officials, and by failing to clearly explain why the decision was 
necessary to preserve a uniquely judicial function, the Krotzer decision has resulted 
in significant confusion as to the scope of its application.  Accordingly, Krotzer has 
since been significantly limited in its application.  See State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 
540, 541 (Minn. 1996) (permitting a stay of adjudication over prosecutor’s 
objection only “for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the 
prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.”) 
(emphasis in original); see also State v. Streiff, 673 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. 2004) 
(Hanson, J., majority opinion) (recognizing the limitations of Krotzer). 
 95. 736 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. 2007). 
 96. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(g) (2006).  In the implied consent 
proceeding, the district court rescinded the revocation after concluding that the 
police officer did not have a particularized and objective basis for stopping the 
defendant.  Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653–54.  At his omnibus hearing during the 
criminal proceedings, the defendant argued that section 169A.53 violated 
separation of powers because preventing a party from re-litigating an issue already 
decided is solely a judicial function.  Id. at 654.  The district court agreed, 
declaring the statute unconstitutional and issuing an injunction that prevented the 
state from enforcing the statute.  Id. 
 97. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 662–63.  The Attorney General represents the state 
at implied consent hearings and the county attorney represents the state at the 
criminal proceeding.  One element of collateral estoppel is that the estopped 
party must have been “a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”  
Willems v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 333 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn. 1983). 
 98. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 665–70 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
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faced with collateral estoppel is only a matter of 
inconvenience, not of fundamental right, I would not 
defer to the legislature as a matter of comity.  I would 
hold that Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(g), is 
unconstitutional and that the judgment in the implied 
consent proceeding operates as collateral estoppel in the 
DWI proceeding to establish that the stop of Lemmer was 
unlawful and that the evidence obtained by that stop must 
be suppressed.99
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNING THE COMMON LAW 
Application of the separation of powers doctrine to the 
substantive common law is another controversial topic.  The 
judiciary has the responsibility to interpret and define the common 
law even where doing so involves the traditionally legislative task of 
weighing competing public policy considerations.100  But equally 
well-established is the principal that the legislature may abrogate or 
change the common law.101  The more difficult issue is whether a 
statute that only partially governs a subject area justifies complete 
deference to the legislature in that entire area.  The general rule in 
these circumstances is that statutes are presumed to be consistent 
with the common law, “and if a statute abrogates the common law, 
the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary 
implication.”102  But application of this rule has divided the court 
on numerous occasions.  In several split decisions, Justice Hanson 
took a strong position favoring the judiciary’s role in governing and 
advancing the common law unless the legislature has unequivocally 
expressed its intent to the contrary. 
His majority opinion in Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC103 
illustrates this debate.  The common law remedy of “procuring 
cause” recognizes a right to commissions for real estate brokers 
 99. Id. at 674. 
 100. A recent example is Justice Hanson’s majority decision in Bjerke v. Johnson, 
742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).  The core issue in Bjerke was whether a homeowner 
had a “special relationship” with a child to whom she provided room, board, and a 
stable home environment, such that the homeowner had a duty to protect the 
child from sexual abuse by another adult resident.  Id. at 662–63.  The court 
recognized the lack of opportunity for self-protection when a child lives away from 
her parents for an extended period and, as a matter of public policy, held that the 
homeowner owed the child a duty to protect her from sexual abuse.  Id. at 665–66. 
 101. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000). 
 102. Id. 
 103. 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2004). 
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who are the procuring cause of a sale, but who are not entitled to 
commissions under the applicable listing agreement because the 
agreement was terminated prior to the closing of the sale.104  After 
the supreme court first announced this equitable remedy, however, 
the legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme 
governing real estate listing agreements and commissions in 
general.105  More specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 82.195 
provided real estate brokers with an “override” right to 
commissions even after termination of the listing agreement if 
within 72 hours the broker provided the other party with a 
“protective list,” which identified those who had made an 
affirmative showing of interest in the property during the period of 
the listing agreement.106  The issue in Rosenberg was whether the 
 104. Id. at 327 (citing Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 55, 78 N.W.2d 315, 
318 (1956)). 
 105. See generally MINN. STAT. Ch. 82 (2002).  More specifically, section 82.195 
generally governed the required content of listing agreements, including: 
 
(1)  a definite expiration date; 
 
(2)  a description of the real property involved; 
 
(3)  the list price and any terms required by the seller; 
 
(4)  the amount of any compensation or commission or the basis for  
   computing the commission; 
 
(5)  a clear statement explaining the events or conditions that will entitle a 
broker to a commission; 
 
(6)  information regarding an override clause, if applicable, including a 
statement to the effect that the override clause will not be effective unless 
the licensee supplies the seller with a protective list within 72 hours after 
the expiration of the listing agreement; [and] 
 
     . . . . 
 
(10) for residential listings, a notice stating that after the expiration of the    
   listing agreement, the seller will not be obligated to pay the licensee a  
   fee or commission if the seller has executed another valid listing  
   agreement pursuant to which the seller is obligated to pay a fee or  
   commission to another licensee for the sale, lease, or exchange of the  
   real property in question.  This notice may be used in the listing  
   agreement for any other type of real estate. 
 
MINN. STAT. § 82.195, subdiv. 2 (2002) (renumbered to MINN. STAT. § 82.21, 
subdiv. 2 (2004)). 
 106. Id.  See also Rosenberg, 685 N.W.2d at 327–30. 
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statutory override remedy abrogated the common law procuring 
cause remedy.107  Justice Hanson identified several reasons why 
section 82.195 did not abrogate the common law: 
 
(1) “[S]ection 82.105 makes no explicit reference to the 
procuring cause remedy and does not state that the 
override remedy displaces any other remedies that 
might be available at common law”;108 
 
(2) The “Scope and Effect” section of chapter 82 indicates 
legislative intent to not abrogate any common law 
remedy;109 
 
(3) Legislative enactments must be particularly clear in 
order to abrogate an equitable remedy, which 
functions “as a supplement to the rest of the law where 
its remedies are inadequate to do complete justice”;110 
and 
 
(4) The override remedy is listed as an optional 
requirement of a listing agreement, which “does not 
suggest an intention of exclusion.”111 
 
Thus, the court concluded that “the override remedy provided 
in section 82.195 was intended to provide an alternative to, but not 
to abrogate, the court’s equitable authority to use the procuring 
cause remedy where necessary to do complete equity.”112
 107. Rosenberg, 685 N.W.2d at 327.  Because the broker failed to demand an 
override clause in the listing agreement, a determination that the statutory 
override remedy was exclusive would have left the broker without any remedy.  See 
id. at 323–24. 
 108. Id. at 328. 
 109. Id. at 329. 
 110. Id. (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 330. 
 112. Id.  Justice Russell Anderson dissented, arguing that “[w]hen the 
legislature provides that events or conditions that will entitle a broker to a 
commission must be explained in a ‘clear statement’ in the listing agreement, I 
would conclude that a common law claim, neither mentioned nor explained by a 
clear statement in a listing agreement, is barred.”  Id. at 333 (Anderson, Russell, J., 
dissenting).  Chief Justice Blatz joined in the dissent. 
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A similar issue was presented in Brekke v. THM Biomedical, 
Inc.113  The issue in Brekke was whether the existence of four 
enumerated statutory exceptions to a wage penalty statute 
indicated the legislature’s intent to abrogate other common law 
defenses.114  A narrow, Justice Hanson-led majority concluded that 
the statutory exceptions were insufficient for a finding of 
abrogation “by express wording or necessary implication.”115  The 
court relied in part on a prior supreme court decision that held the 
common law defense of forfeiture was available to employers.116  As 
in Rosenberg, the court noted the presumption of no abrogation, the 
court’s strong reluctance to find implied abrogation of equitable 
remedies, the absence of an express reference to the common law 
principles at issue, and no other evidence of legislative intent to 
abrogate.117
A third example involved the ability of the court to recognize 
new common law rights in areas where the legislature had partially 
spoken, but did not express a clear intent to abrogate all new 
common law remedies.  The issue in Larson v. Wasemiller118 was 
whether Minnesota should recognize a new common law cause of 
action against a hospital for negligently issuing credentials to 
surgeons.  Writing for the majority, Justice Hanson examined the 
public policy considerations for and against, and concluded that 
“the tort of negligent credentialing is inherent in and the natural 
extension of well-established common law rights,” a holding that 
 113. 683 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 2004). 
 114. Id. at 775.  The wage statute at issue provided for a penalty if an employer 
made any deduction from an employee’s wages for lost or stolen property, for 
damage to property, or to recover for a debt.  MINN. STAT. § 181.79, subdiv. 1 
(2004).  The employee in Brekke was also an officer, director, and shareholder of 
the closely-held corporation that deducted the loan amount from his salary.  683 
N.W.2d at 772–73.  The corporation did not argue that any of the four statutory 
exceptions applied.  Id. at 775.  Instead, the corporation argued that the 
employee’s own breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties made the 
common law affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel applicable to bar the 
employee’s claim.  Id. at 776–77. 
 115. Brekke, 683 N.W.2d at 776–77 (quoting Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 
314 (Minn. 2000)). 
 116. Id. at 775–76.  The court discussed Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply Co., 
where an employer argued that it was entitled to withhold wages because the 
employee forfeited his right to rely on the wage statute by embezzling funds from 
the employer.  436 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. 1989).  Although forfeiture is not an 
enumerated statutory exception, the court found no legislative intent to abrogate 
the common law defense of forfeiture.  Id. 
 117. Brekke, 683 N.W.2d at 776. 
 118. 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007). 
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the court found to be consistent with the law in twenty-seven other 
states.119  But the hospital argued that Minnesota’s “peer review 
statute”—which governs credentialing of medical professionals and 
provides for certain limits on liability—abrogates any common law 
claim for negligent credentialing because of certain conflicts 
between the two.120  The court disagreed: 
Although the plain language of . . . section 145.63 does 
limit the liability of hospitals and credentials committees, 
it in no way indicates intent to immunize hospitals, or to 
abrogate a common law claim for negligent credentialing 
. . . .  If the legislature had intended to foreclose the 
possibility of a cause of action for negligent credentialing, 
it would not have addressed the standard of care 
applicable to such an action.121
Accordingly, the court adopted a new common law claim in 
Minnesota. 
Justice Hanson also weighed in on the highly publicized case 
involving the impact of the Workers Compensation Act on an 
injured employee’s common law right to recover from a co-
employee.122  The legislature changed the common law by limiting 
 119. Id. at 303–09.  These findings satisfy two of the four prongs in the test for 
deciding whether to recognize a new common law tort: “(1) whether the tort is 
inherent in, or the natural extension of, a well-established common law right, 
[and] (2) whether the tort has been recognized in other common law states . . . .”  
Id. at 304 (citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234–36 (Minn. 
1998)).  The other two prongs are: “(3) whether recognition of a cause of action 
will create tension with other applicable laws, and (4) whether such tension is out-
weighed by the importance of the additional protections that recognition of the 
claim would provide to injured persons.”  Id. 
 120. Id. at 309–11.  The hospital relied on Minnesota Statutes section 145.64, 
subdivision 1 (2006), which prohibits review organizations (such as the hospital) 
from disclosing information revealed during a peer review proceeding.  Id. at 309.  
The hospital argued that if negligent credentialing were recognized, this statute 
would prevent it from defending itself because it would not be able to disclose the 
information that it knew at the time it issued the credentials.  Id.  The hospital also 
cited a limited liability provision, which immunizes decisions of a review 
organization if it acted “in the reasonable belief that the action or 
recommendation is warranted by facts known to the person or the review 
organization after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts upon which the review 
organization’s action or recommendation is made . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 145.63, 
subdiv. 1 (2006).  The hospital argued that this statute conflicts with the proposed 
cause of action for negligent credentialing because it “creates a standard of care 
different from the standard of care applicable to a simple negligence claim, 
effectively elevating the burden of proof necessary to succeed in a claim against a 
hospital for credentialing decisions.”  Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 311. 
 121. Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 311. 
 122. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 763–68 
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tort recovery from co-employees to gross negligence only.123  The 
majority further limited recovery by holding that tort victims must 
also show that the co-employee was acting outside the course and 
scope of employment.124  Justice Hanson dissented, arguing that 
because there are competing policy concerns relating to the scope 
of co-employee liability, any narrowing of the common law should 
come from the legislature, not the court.125  Because he found no 
express legislative intent to restrict co-employee liability in such a 
way, he would have allowed the case to proceed to trial on the issue 
of whether the co-employees were grossly negligent.126
Justice Hanson also dissented in Urban v. American Legion 
Department of Minnesota,127 where the court was asked to determine 
whether the state and national chapters of the American Legion 
could be held vicariously liable for the dram shop liability of a local 
post.128  The Minnesota Civil Damages Act (CDA) created a new 
cause of action against liquor licensees that did not exist at 
common law.129  Under the common law, this direct statutory 
liability would impose vicarious liability against the liable party’s 
master.130  But the majority focused on a different statute, section 
340A.501, which makes the acts of an employee who sells alcohol 
the same as the acts of the employer for purposes of the CDA.131  
The majority concluded that because section 340A.501 imposes 
vicarious liability under certain circumstances, this indicates a 
legislative intent to abolish vicarious liability under the CDA in all 
(Minn. 2005) (Hanson, J., dissenting).  Former Vikings player Korey Stringer died 
from heat stroke in August of 2001 after two days of practice in high heat and 
humidity.  Id. at 748–50, 753.  The issue on appeal involved the liability of the 
Vikings’ medical services coordinator and an assistant trainer in providing care 
and preventative treatment to Stringer.  Id. at 753. 
 123. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2006). 
 124. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757–58.  Justice Paul Anderson authored the four 
justice majority opinion.  Justice Page—a former Minnesota Vikings player—
recused himself.  Justice Meyer joined in the dissent of Justice Hanson. 
 125. Id. at 763–64 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 764–65, 768. 
 127. 723 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006). 
 128. Id. at 2. 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subdiv. 1 (2006).  More specifically, the CDA 
imposes dram shop liability for damages caused by an intoxicated person “against 
a person who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic 
beverages.”  Id. 
 130. Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 
(1973). 
 131. MINN. STAT. § 340A.501 (2006). 
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other circumstances, including dram shop liability.132  Justice 
Hanson disagreed, arguing that “the CDA does not abrogate, but 
instead incorporates, common law principles of vicarious 
liability.”133  He explained that section 340A.501 does not create 
vicarious liability; it “add[s] to a licensee’s common law vicarious 
liability as an employer by creating a direct statutory liability.”134  
Because he believed this did not constitute clear legislative intent 
to abolish the common law, Justice Hanson concluded that 
vicarious liability should apply to the masters of licensees who are 
directly liable under section 340A.801.135
These decisions illustrate Justice Hanson’s concerns over 
eroding the common law because of blind judicial deference to 
legislative inaction or partial action.  His work reflects his 
conviction toward preserving the function of the judiciary in 
governing the common law.  But also underlying these decisions is 
 132. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 4–7.  It is difficult to reconcile this holding with Isles 
Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn. 
2005).  The Isles Wellness court ultimately held that the corporate practice of 
chiropractic medicine was illegal because (1) Minnesota common law prohibits 
the corporate practice of medicine, and (2) chiropractic constitutes the practice of 
medicine.  Id. at 521, 524.  But the court had to explain why two statutes that 
specifically prohibited the corporate practice of dentistry and veterinary medicine 
did not indicate legislative intent to abrogate the common law prohibition of 
corporations practicing all other types of medicine.  The only explanation offered 
was that the abrogation was not made “by express wording or necessary 
implication.”  Id. at 521.  It is difficult to understand how section 340A.501 
indicates an intent to abrogate the common law when the statutes prohibiting 
dentistry and veterinary medicine do not.  It should be noted that Justice Hanson 
filed a dissenting opinion in Isles Wellness because he believed that the Minnesota 
common law did not support a prohibition against the corporate practice of 
medicine. 
 133. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 7 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).  Justice Hanson focused on the language in 
section 340A.501 that makes the act of the employee the same as the act of the 
employer for purposes of the CDA.  Id.  By way of contrast, vicarious liability 
recognizes that the acts of the employee and the employer are distinct, but 
imposes liability on the employer as a matter of “public policy to satisfy an 
instinctive sense of justice.”  Id. at 8 (quoting Lange, 297 Minn. at 403, 211 N.W.2d 
at 785).  Justice Hanson ultimately believed the majority erred by improperly 
presuming that section 340A.501 abrogated the common law and relying on the 
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, instead of presuming that the 
legislature did not abrogate the common law absent clear intent to the contrary.  
Id. at 8–9. 
 135. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 9.  But Justice Hanson believed there were genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether the state and national chapters of the 
American Legion were in a principal-agent relationship such as to support a claim 
for vicarious liability.  Id. at 12–13. 
27
Ehrich: A Legacy of Scholarship: The Judicial Decisions of Justice Samuel
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
2. EHRICH - ADC 5/3/2008  11:05:08 AM 
1276 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
 
Justice Hanson’s desire to safeguard the rights of tort victims 
seeking recovery for their injuries.  Nowhere did he make this 
desire more poignant than in his dissenting opinion from Schroeder 
v. St. Louis County.136
IV. THE SCHROEDER DISSENT 
Under the government immunity doctrine, tort victims face 
substantial barriers to recovery from governmental tortfeasors.  
First, statutory immunity bars recovery for “[a]ny claim based upon 
the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is 
abused.”137  Next, official immunity shields “a public official 
charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his 
judgment or discretion . . . .”138  Further, vicarious official immunity 
shields a government agency when its employee’s conduct is 
protected by the official immunity doctrine.139  And an entirely 
different immunity analysis applies to claims based on a violation of 
the United States Constitution.140
Several of these doctrines were invoked in the Schroeder 
decision.141  The plaintiff in Schroeder was killed when he collided 
with a county-operated road grader operating on the wrong side of 
the road.142  The majority held that the county was entitled to 
statutory immunity because operating the road grader against 
 136. 708 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2006). 
 137. MINN. STAT. § 466.03, subdiv. 6 (2006).  Statutory immunity has generally 
been interpreted to only apply to policy making-type activities.  Nusbaum v. 
County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 1988).  For purposes of this 
determination, courts distinguish between planning functions, which involve the 
consideration of social, political, or economic considerations and operational 
functions, which involve the day-to-day operations of government, technical or 
scientific skills, or the exercise of professional judgment.  Holmquist v. State, 425 
N.W.2d 230, 231–32 (Minn. 1988). 
 138. Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 
(Minn. 2004) (quoting Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 
1988)).  Generally, the official immunity analysis inquires as to whether the 
government official was exercising a ministerial function, which can give rise to 
liability, or a discretionary function, which is protected.  Id. 
 139. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1992). 
 140. See Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 483 (Minn. 2006) (explaining 
that “[q]ualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability ‘if their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.’”) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 141. 708 N.W.2d at 503. 
 142. Id. at 500–01. 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/6
2. EHRICH - ADC 5/3/2008  11:05:08 AM 
2008] A LEGACY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1277 
 
traffic was the result of an unwritten, policy-based decision that 
saved the county money.143  In a dissent that is far longer than the 
majority opinion, Justice Hanson first noted the irony associated 
with the court’s historically broad construction of statutory 
immunity: 
If the grader operator had been working for a private 
party, he and his employer would surely be liable.  In fact, 
if the private employer had made a policy decision to 
permit the creation of this dangerous condition, by 
weighing the cost of remedying the danger against the 
risk to human life, we would consider that policy 
reprehensible—a callous disregard for the safety of others 
that would warrant the imposition of punitive damages.  
The question then is whether comparable conduct by the 
government should escape liability, precisely because it 
involved a policy made by weighing the cost of remedying 
a dangerous condition against the risk to human life.  I 
would first conclude that, under an appropriately narrow 
construction of our existing tort immunity law, the county 
should not escape liability.  But if our existing tort 
immunity law does not yield this result, then I would 
conclude that it is time to seriously reexamine that law.144
Although the supreme court previously held to the contrary,145 
Justice Hanson explained that it is more logical and more 
appropriate to not apply the statutory immunity exception to 
situations where the government failed to warn of a dangerous 
condition that it created.146  He concluded by suggesting that there 
exists a substantial basis to overrule the court’s prior cases that held 
to the contrary.147
 143. Id. at 505. 
 144. Id. at 509 (Hanson, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 145. See Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 234–35 (Minn. 1988). 
 146. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 513 (Hanson, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(describing the term “statutory immunity” as “misnomer,” because it appears in a 
statutory scheme with the “primary effect . . . of establish[ing] governmental 
liability for the torts of its employees . . .”).  The statutory immunity provision is 
merely an exception that is extended to those acts.  Id. 
 147. See id. at 513.  However, because the Schroeders did not raise this issue, 
Justice Hanson agreed with the majority that the court’s precedent should be 
applied.  Id.  But he wrote separately to express his opinion that the court “should 
be open to reexamine the question in a future case that presents it more fully and 
squarely . . . .”  Id.  Justice Hanson went on to disagree with the majority’s 
application of the statutory immunity exception.  In his characteristic mastery of 
the factual record, Justice Hanson cited affidavit testimony, deposition testimony, 
and exhibits in reaching his conclusion that the county was not entitled to 
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Noting that the doctrine is often applied but rarely 
questioned, Justice Hanson then took the opportunity to critically 
analyze the history and policy considerations underlying the official 
immunity doctrine as well.  He argued that the core justification for 
official immunity—to avoid deterring independent action and 
effective performance by government officials—has been “seriously 
questioned” by reputed commentators,148 and has been all but 
eliminated by the passage of the Municipal Tort Claims Act.149  
Justice Hanson concluded his dissent by characterizing official 
immunity as a doctrine that is “not firmly grounded in reasoned 
analysis.”150
Although Justice Hanson made a compelling case for limiting 
statutory immunity and abolishing official immunity, he ultimately 
conceded that Schroeder was not the appropriate case to take such 
drastic measures.151  But his exhaustive research, thorough analysis, 
convincing logic, and candid acknowledgement of the court’s prior 
oversights is certain to catch the attention of tort victims wading 
their way through the government “immunity thicket”152 in the 
immunity because the road grade operator failed to comply with the policy.  Id. at 
516. 
 148. Id. at 518 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 273, at 733 (West 
Group 2000)). 
 149. Id.  Justice Hanson argued that: 
the Municipal Tort Claims Act did adopt four provisions that 
essentially eliminated the policy concerns that underlie official 
immunity: (1) it established liability limits that also apply to direct 
claims against public officers and employees (Minn. Stat. § 466.04, 
subdiv. 1(a) (2004)); (2) it required that a notice of claim be given 
within 180 days after loss or within 1 year for wrongful death (Minn. 
Stat. § 466.05 (2004)); (3) it authorized the municipality to procure 
insurance against liability, including that for liability of "its officers, 
employees, and agents" (Minn. Stat. § 466.06 (2004)); and (4) it 
required the municipality to defend and indemnify its "officers and 
employees," subject to certain qualifications (Minn. Stat. § 466.07, 
subdiv. 1 (2004)). 
Id. at 517–18. 
 150. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 520.  Again, Justice Hanson declined to reverse 
the court’s precedent in this case because the appellant failed to raise the issue.  
Id. at 519.  Thus Justice Hanson agreed with the majority that the driver of the 
road grader was entitled to official immunity.  Id.  But he disagreed with the 
majority’s conclusion that vicarious official immunity for the county necessarily 
followed.  Id.  After an extensive analysis of the competing policy considerations, 
Justice Hanson concluded that “[w]hen the interests of the county . . . are weighed 
against the interests of an innocent victim to obtain compensation, I would 
conclude that vicarious official immunity should not be available.”  Id. at 521. 
 151. Id. at 513, 519. 
 152. Michael K. Jordan, Finding a Useful Path Through the Immunity Thicket, 61 
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future.  Perhaps that occasion will arise sooner than he expected.  
When questioning the logic of immunizing policy decisions where 
the government has no need to weigh the risk of liability for poor 
choices, Justice Hanson posed a prophetic rhetorical question: 
Could a county, for example, allow travelers to continue 
to use an unsafe bridge, without warning, because it 
weighed the safety of the travelers against budget 
constraints that made it financially difficult to make the 
bridge safe?  One would hope not, but the extension of 
the discretionary function exception to the deliberate 
abdication of governmental responsibilities, purely for 
cost-saving reasons, could produce precisely that extreme 
result.153
The collapse of the I-35 Bridge in downtown Minneapolis less 
than two years later may well result in the litigation of this precise 
issue.  Accordingly, the Schroeder dissent may prove to be Justice 
Hanson’s most significant work. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One need not have worked closely with Justice Hanson to 
appreciate the many qualities that describe his judicial career: 
impartiality, respect for the rule of law, scholarship, passion for his 
work, and deference to the division of governmental powers are 
among the many discussed in this article.  Perhaps most revealing is 
that these qualities are manifested in cases across such a broad 
spectrum of factual circumstances and areas of law.  Whether the 
issue sounded in tort, contract, statute, the common law, court 
rules, or constitutional interpretation, litigants could be assured 
that every argument would be closely scrutinized, every brief 
thoroughly reviewed, every issue independently researched, and 
every opinion carefully drafted. 
Those who have had the honor of working directly with Justice 
Hanson witnessed the foundations of these qualities.  His desk was 
routinely covered with open volumes of the Northwest Reporter.  
And it was not uncommon to find him reading reporters from 
other jurisdictions.  Nor was it unusual to pass him in the treatise 
aisle of the supreme court library, or to find him in his law clerk’s 
office pouring over deposition and trial transcripts.  On the bench, 
BENCH & BAR OF MINN., 24, 28–29 (Oct. 2004). 
 153. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 512 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
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his reverent demeanor put practitioners at ease; but his incisive 
questions struck at the heart of the controversy, exposing 
weaknesses in arguments and enriching debate.  The product of 
Justice Hanson’s work is a legacy of scholarship that will extend far 
beyond the relatively short duration of his time on the bench. 
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